Il cable che avrebbe dovuto fare luce completa sulla diatriba Google Cina, in realtà non rivela molto più di quanto già non fosse uscito da indiscrezioni e supposizioni in questo periodo di tempo passato tra lo scoppio del caso e le prime rivelazioni circa il contenuto dei cable dell'ambasciata Usa a Pechino.
Questo non sminuisce l'opera di conoscenza che Wikileaks sta permettendo a ogni singolo individuo interessato a leggere i cable, semmai rende più evidenti alcuni sospetti della prima ora, aiutando una lettura più razionale dei fatti.
Quando scoppiò il caso Google in Cina, la scintilla fu fin da subito riconosciuta nell'attacco informatico subito dai server Google, comprese le caselle mail di molti attiviti cinesi. Google e Stati Uniti non avevano dubbi circa la provenienza dell'attacco, anche se ufficialmente non accusarono mai direttamente la Cina.
Dall'ambasciata di Pechino era però arrivato il cable che animava lo scontro, facendo ricadere la responsabilità del dilemma (maodun in cinese) di Google in Cina, sulle spalle di un importante funzionario cinese, irritato per avere scoperto che anche su google.cn esisteva la possibilità di fare ricerche sul dominio .com
La riflessione dei cinesi al riguardo, dopo un primo momento di sbandamento, risulta inquietante: secondo quanto scritto nei cable da tutta la vicenda, i cinesi avrebbero dedotto che internet al contrario di quanto si possa pensare, è controllabile.
Li Changchun, classe 1944, membro del Politburo si era googlato (qui la ricerca del suo nome sul Google di Hong Kong) scoprendo articoli e opinioni contrarie al suo operato. Da qui sarebbe partita la volontà di ostacolare il motore di ricerca di Mountain View. Tutto per un dilemma, una contraddizione, più che per favorire, come si scrisse e disse in molti casi, Baidu a discapito di Google, nel mercato internet più vasto del mondo. Insomma, la questione sarebbe nata da una vicenda personale, non da riflessioni strategiche economiche. Li Changchun aveva scoperto che per quanto gli accordi avessero obbligato Google a filtrare i contenuti rilasciati dal suo motore di ricerca cinese, esisteva la possibilità di ovviare ai filtri, scoprendo amare verità.
Non mancano naturalmente alcuni spunti intriganti, nel cable presentato ieri sera dai giornali in possesso delle informazioni passate da Wikileaks. Nella nota si legge che secondo il contatto cinese dell'ambasciata americana, Baidu sembrava una noiosa e grigia impresa statale mentre Google sembra molto interessante, come il frutto proibito. Al popolo cinese sarebbe sembrato molto chiaro che Google e il governo americano stavano lavorando insieme per la libertà di Internet e per minare i controlli del governo cinese su Internet. Questo avrebbe reso felici alcuni intellettuali, ma da altri sarebbe considerato come un'ingerenza negli affari interni della Cina.
Infine nella nota emerge la vicinanza tra Google e le autorità politche Usa in Cina: questo conferma come l'intervento di allora di Hillary Clinton, con il suo famoso discorso sulla libertà della rete, fosse legato a doppio filo con le vicende di Google in Cina.
Di seguito, il cable originale in questione:
SUBJECT: GOOGLE UPDATE: PRC ROLE IN ATTACKS AND RESPONSE STRATEGY
BEIJING XXXXXXXXXXXX 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Robert Goldberg. Reasons 1.4 (b), (d).
1. (S) Summary: A well-placed contact claims that the Chinese government coordinated the recent intrusions of Google systems. According to our contact, the closely held operations were directed at the Politburo Standing Committee level.
— Another contact claimed a top PRC leader was actively working with Google competitor Baidu against Google.
— Chinese concerns over the recent Google threat to take down the company's Chinese-language search engine google.cn over censorship and hacking allegations were focused on the service's growing popularity among Chinese Internet users and a perception that the USG and Google were working in concert.
— An appeal to nationalism seems to be the Chinese government's chosen option to counter Google's demand to provide unfiltered web content.
— Contacts in the technology industry tell us that Chinese interference in the operations of foreign businesses is widespread and often underreported to U.S. parent companies. End Summary.
Attacks Directed at High Level
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2. (S) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff that the closely held Chinese government operations against Google had been coordinated out of the State Council Information Office XXXXXXXXXXXX It was not until Google's public announcement of the intrusions into its systems that the issue had been discussed more widely within the Party. (Note: It is unclear whether President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao were aware of these actions before Google's going public.) As a result of Google's announcement, the PBSC had taken up the issue of Internet controls and the Google case in a series of meetings (reftel). XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that PRC operations against Google were "one hundred percent" political in nature and had nothing to do with removing Google, with its minority market share, as a competitor to Chinese search engines. Separately, XXXXXXXXXXXX told ECON MinCouns that he believed PBSC member XXXXXXXXXXXX was working actively with Chinese Internet search giant Baidu against Google's interests in China.
PRC Sees USG and Google Working Together
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3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX told PolOff XXXXXXXXXXXX that Google's recent move presented a major dilemma (maodun) for the Chinese government, not because of the cyber-security aspect but because of Google's direct challenge to China's legal restrictions on Internet content. The immediate strategy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, seemed to be to appeal to Chinese nationalism by accusing Google and the U.S. government of working together to force China to accept "Western values" and undermine China's rule of law. The problem the censors were facing, however, was that Google's demand to deliver uncensored search results was very difficult to spin as an attack on China, and the entire episode had made Google more interesting and attractive to Chinese Internet users. All of a sudden, XXXXXXXXXXXX continued, Baidu looked like a boring state-owned enterprise while Google "seems very attractive, like the forbidden fruit." He said it "seems clear" to the Chinese people that Google and the U.S. government were working together on Internet freedom and to undermine Chinese government controls on the Internet. That made some intellectuals happy, XXXXXXXXXXXX said, but "some others" regarded it as interference in China's internal affairs.
Industry: Interference Common, Paranoia Driving PRC Policy
——————————————— ————-
BEIJING XXXXXXXXXXXX OF 002
4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted the pronounced disconnect between views of U.S. parent companies and local subsidiaries. PRC-based company officials often downplayed the extent of PRC government interference in their operations for fear of consequences for their local markets. Our contact emphasized that Google and other U.S. companies in China were struggling with the stated Chinese goal of technology transfer for the purpose of excluding foreign competition. This consultant noted the Chinese were exploiting the global economic downturn to enact increasingly draconian product certification and government procurement regulations to force foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to transfer intellectual property and to carve away the market share of foreign companies.
Chinese Media: American Hypocrisy and Cultural Hegemony
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5. (U) The Secretary's speech continued to dominate headlines January 25-26, with the official People's Daily (circ 2.2 million) alleging collusion between U.S. officials and the business community as evidenced by the propinquity of Google's rethink of its China business and the Secretary's speech. Chinese media again accused the U.S. of "cultural hegemony" for setting the standards for "so-called Internet freedom8 and of hypocrisy for calling for the free flow of information while using the Internet as a political and military tool. People's Daily-affiliated Global Times English (circ 150,000) called the speech a "milestone" showing that U.S. and Western political interests were "taking over every dimension" of cyberspace.
6. (U) The Party-affiliated Beijing News (circ 530,000) opined that the speech showed "a huge gap between Chinese and American information industries, which may lead to a trade war strategy." In an article headlined "China Intensifies Counterattack on Internet Accusation," Global Times Chinese (circ 1.3 million) quoted Chinese scholar Niu Xinchun as rejecting the theory that U.S.-China conflict would replace the "G2" cooperation model, noting that U.S. attacks usually ended "poorly" when the U.S. considered its practical interests. Many papers quoted statements from the State Council Information Office and Ministry of Industry and Information Technology calling Chinese Internet controls "legitimate" and saying they should not be subject to "unjustifiable interference." Papers continued to conflate Google's China business strategy with the Secretary's speech.
Blogging Circumscribed
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7. XXXXXXXXXXXX Anecdotally, censors appear to have cracked down on blogging about the Secretary's speech. Several bloggers who attended our XXXXXXXXXXXX told us subsequently they had been instructed to take down their entries about the event XXXXXXXXXXXX. Secretary Clinton's speech is currently blocked in Chinese on state.gov but remains accessible on the U.S. Embassy website in both English and Chinese. HUNTSMAN
[Anche su wired.it]